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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
NORl\,1A LEE :MADSEN, 
Plaintiff-Responilent, 
-vs-
'\TALKER BANK & TRUST 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE::\1ENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Respondent 
(hereinafter called :Miss :Madsen), against the De-
fendant Appellant bank (hereinafter referred to as the 
Bank), for damages incurred by the Bank's negligence 
in accepting and forwarding a $5,500.00 check without 
an endorsement. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Respondent agrees with the statement of the 
Disposit'.on in the Lower Court set forth in the Appel-
lant's Brief. 
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RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent requests that the Judgment of 
the Lower Court be affirmed. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff, Norma Lee :Madsen, had main-
tained both a savings and a checking account with the 
Sugar house lhanch of the Defendant, '\Talker Bank 
and Trust Company, continuously for approximately 
twenty-five years prior to the filing of this action, and 
the relationship between ~Iiss ~Iadsen and the Bank 
had been satisfactory until the events giving rise to 
this action. ( R. 169, 170) . 
Prior to ~lay of 1969, ~liss ~Iadsen 1 o an e d 
$5,000.00 to a Darrell G. llafen. (R. 173). From ~lay 
1969 until December, 1969, ~Iiss :l\Iadsen attempted 
unsuccessfully to collect this loan from ~Ir. Hafen, 
during which time ~Ir. Ilafen gave ~Iiss ~Iadsen at 
least hvo checks ·which were returned by the Banks 
marked "Insufficient Funds" or "Account Closed." 
( R. 173, 17 4). 'Vhile .l\I iss ~Iadsen was attempting to 
.., 
collect this obligation, she regularly conferred with 
officials of the Sugarhouse Branch of the '\Talker Bank 
and Trust Company regarding the matter, and at least ' 
three officers of the Bank-namely, ~Ir.John Doherty, 
Assistant Vice-President and Branch :i\Ianager; Dale 
Steadm:m, Assistant Cashier and Operations Officer 
at the Sugarhouse Branch; and Colene Day - were 
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personally aware of the difficulties which l\Iiss :Madsen 
had in collecting this check. (R. 4a, 174-177, 181). 
On December 4th, 1!)69, .Mr. Hafen gave l\Iiss 
l\Iadsen a check in the amount of $5,500.00 drawn on 
the account of Dixie :l\Iinerals and Water, Inc., at the 
Draper Bank and Trust Company, informing her that 
he had deposited sufficient monies to pay this check. 
(R. 178) .. Miss .l\ladsen went immediately to the Sugar-
house Branch of the '1Valker Bank and Trust Company, 
at which time she showed the check to one of the officers 
of the Bank who had knowledge of the circumstances 
smTotmding payment of this check, who, in turn, ex-
pressed satisfaction that :Miss .Madsen had been paid 
and instructed her to have a t e 11 er call Draper 
Bank and Trust Company to verify that the money 
was in the account. (R. 178, 181, 182). The officer 
gave .Miss :Madsen no instructions or indications that 
she should take any actions other than to deposit the 
check with '\Talker Bank. ( R. 182) . l\I iss l\Iadsen then 
went to a teller's cage and deposited in her checking 
account a number of other small checks which the teller 
checked for endorsements before depositing. (R. 182-
183) . After this transaction was completed and the 
small checks were processed, l\Iiss l\Iadsen presented the 
teller with the check in question for deposit in her sav-
ings account and, in accordance with the Bank officer's 
directions, requested that the teller call Draper Bank 
and Trust Company to verify that there were sufficient 
funds in that Bank to pay the subject check. (R. 183-
184). l\liss .l\ladsen had not endorsed the check at that 
time pernling the confirmation from Draper Bank and 
Trust Company because she did not want to make the 
check a negotiable instrument until the check was 
actually deposited. ( R. 180). The teller took the check 
from .l\Iiss :Madsen's possession, left the teller's cage, 
telephoned Draper Bank and Trust Company, in· 
formed .l\Iiss ~Iadsen that the money was in the account, 
and deposited the check in .Miss l\ladsen's savings ac-
count without ever returning the check to :l\Iiss l\Ia<l-
sen's possession or control for endorsement (R. 183-
186), and without supplying the Bank's substitute en-
dorsement ("credited to the account of the within-named 
payee"), which would ha\'e ensured payment of this 
check. (R. 21, 259). 
The check apparently was processed through 
normal banking channels where it reached Draper Bank 
and 'Trust Company on December 8th, HW9, (R. 230), 
at which time there were sufficient funds in the account 
to cover the check, and Draper Bank and Trust Com· 
pany would indeed have paid the check if it had con· 
tained either l\ I iss .l\ladsen' s endorsement or Walker 
Bank's substitute endorsement. (R. 254-255, 2.59). 
Draper Bank and Trust Company, however, returned 
the check to lV alker Bank and Trust because there was 
no endorsement. Upon return of the check, and with· 
out notice to :Miss .l\Iadsen, '\Talker I~ank affixed its 
substitute endorsement on the check and returned the 
check through banking channels to Draper Bank and 
Trust Company; however, prior to receipt of the check 
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the second time by Draper Bank and Trnst, the account 
on which the check was written was attached through 
legal process by third parties. (R. 256). The check was 
again returned to 'Valker Bank and Trust Company, 
and the Bank reversed the credit in her savings account. 
Although the subject check was deposited for collec-
tion with Walker Bank and Trust Company on Decem-
ber 4, 1969, .l\1iss :Madsen was never notified that any 
problem existed with regard to the check until Decem-
ber 17, 19~. (R. 28, 186) . 
. l\liss :Madsen brought an action against 'Valker 
Bank and Trust Company and Draper Bank and Trust 
Company to recover the amount of the check. The jury 
at the trial found that Walker Bank was negligent in 
accepting and forwarding the subject check without an 
endorsement, and Judgment was rendered in favor of 
Plaintiff. 
'i\r ALKER BANK '1\7 AS NJ<~GLIGENT IN ITS 
FAILURE TO HANDLE THE SUBJECT 
CHECK 'VITH DUE CARE REQUIRED BY 
THE UN IQ U E CIRCUMSTANCES SUR-
ROUNDING THE CHECK'S DEPOSIT AND 
COLLECTION. 
The circumstances surrounding the acceptance and 
forwarding of the check which is the subject of this 
action differ in the following ways from the procedures 
utilized by Walker Bank in the processing and trans-
f ering of virtually all other checks which pass through 
the Bank: 
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A. Unlike other checks, at least three of the of-
ficers of the Sugarhouse l3ranch of 'V alker Bank were 
av .. are of circumstances regarding previous attempts 
to collect the obligation owing by Darrell I-Iafen to the 
Uespondent, including knowledge of circumstances 
surrounding the attempted collection of earlier checks 
and numerous discussions of these problems with :Miss 
l\iadsen. 
B. Unlike other checks, an officer of the Bank 
who had knowledge of circumstances regarding the at-
tempted collection of the obligation, discussed the col-
lection of the subject check on the morning the check 
was pl~ced with the Bank for collection. 
C. Unlike other checks, this bank officer directed 
.l\Iiss .1\Iadsen to ask a hank teller to cali Draper Bank 
and Trust Company to verify that funds were in the 
Bank, thus impliedly assuring :Miss :Madsen that the 
Bank would use care in collecting the check. 
D. Finally, unlike other checks, the Bank teller 
telephoned Draper Bank & Trust Company to verify 
that sufficient funds were in that llank to pay the check 
prior to crediting the check to .l\liss :Madsen's Savings 
Account. 
l\Ir. John Doherty, the Assistant Vice-President 
awl Assistant :l\lanager of the Sugarhouse llranch of-
fice of 'Valker Bank, testified at the trial that, while 
more than 5,000 checks go through the Sugarhouse 
Branch of \V alker Bank daily, not even on the average 
7 
of once a day does an of ficcr of the Bank have occa-
sion to talk with a person regarding problems surround-
ing the collecting of one particular check. ( R. 246-
248). l\loreover, .Mr. Doherty testified that it is not 
the general practice of 'V alker Bank to telephone 
another lhnk, when the check is placed for collection, 
to yerify that the money is in the other bank. (R. 246-
247). Therefore, with respect to the subject check, the 
Appellant and Respondent established a course of deal-
ing which placed the transaction outside the usual cov-
erage of the Uniform Commercial Code. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 70A-l-205(1) (1953) provides that: 
A course of dealing is a sequence of previous 
conduct between the parties to a particular 
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as 
establishing a common basis of understanding 
for interpreting their expressions and other 
conduct. See also Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-
204 ( l) (1953); Utah Code Ann. § 70A-
l-20(16) (1953); 1. Anderson's Uniform 
Commercial Code, 1-205 :2, 3, 6. 
Despite the Bank's knowledge of circumstances 
surrounding the subject check, affirmative actions 
which Bank officers and agents took in instructing l\Iiss 
l\Iadsen regarding the procedure to follow in cashing 
the check, and the Uank's knowledge of the necessity 
of handling the check in a careful manner, the Bank 
was negligent by allowing the check to leave the Bank 
without Miss Madsen's endorsement or supplying its 
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own substitute endorsement, although testimony at the 
trial indicated that the teller had manually stamped the 
llank's usual endorsement on the hack of the check. 
(R. 219-222) .. l\Ioreover, when the check was returned 
for lack of endorsement, the Bank then supplied its 
substitute endorsement and sent the check back to 
Draper Rank without informing Miss ·l\Iadsen of any 
difficulties regarding the check, and l\Iiss l\Iadsen 
never learned of any problems regarding the check until 
thirteen days after it was initially deposited. 
Despite the peculiarity of the circumstances sur-
rounding the subject check, and the particular knowl-
edge and actions of officers of "\V alker l3:mk with re-
spect to that check, the Appellant argues that l\liss 
l\ladsen cannot recover her damages resulting from the 
Bank's negligence, but that the Uniform Commercial 
Cocle pre-empts the area of commercial paper and pre-
cludes recovery in this case. It is clear, however, from 
an examination of the Uniform Commercial Code that 
the Uank cannot plead a defense based upon the protec-
tion which the lJ ni form Commercial Code provides to 
Uanks with regard to checks which are handled with 
reasonable care and in the ordinary course of business. 
llather, the Code provides its protection only in those 
circumstances in which the Code's provisions have been 
followed by the lhnk and when the Bank has not vio-
lated its duty to use reasonable care. Even the Appel-
lant acknowledges, on page 11 of its Brief, that some 
circumstances may require more than ordinary care for 
a particular check, and the jury obviously found that 
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such a circumstance existed in this case. Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code a bank ordinarily may supply 
a substitute endorsement in lieu of the customer's en-
dorsement. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-205 (1953}. 
'iVhile this ordinarily does not require the Bank to 
supply a missing endorsement, the jury determined in 
this case that the Bank had an affirmative duty either 
to obtain .l\Iiss :Madsen's endorsement or to supply its 
own endorsement because of the peculiarity of circum-
stances of the case. 
Despite the Appellant's allegation that the jury 
was not instructed with i·egard to specific provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the jury was pro-
vided with extensi,·e testimony regarding banking law 
and procedures, Federal Reserve Operating Provisions, 
Clearing House Rules, customs and usages of banks in 
Utah, and the procedures of 'Valker Bank. Of the four 
( 4) witnesses giving testimony at the trial, three ( 3} 
were officers or employees of Defendant Banks, spe-
cifically: John Doherty, Assistant Vice-President and 
Assistant .l\1 anager of the Sugarhouse Branch of 
\Valker Bank (R. 217-218}; Richard Kieffer, Second 
Vice-President and Coordinator of Operations of 
'V alker Bank ( R. 269) ; Doyle Johnson, Cashier of 
Draper Bank and Trust (R. 251); and Jolene Cowley, 
the Teller who handled the subject for Walker Bank 
and Trust Company. (R. 262-263}. Viitually all of 
the testimony of these four ( 4) witnesses was concerned 
with describing normal procedures for the handling of 
checks, and the jury's determination of negligence re-
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suited from the fact that 'Valker Bank complied only 
with ordinary procedures in this case rather than using 
the degree of care required under the circumstances. 
The Uniform Commercial Code was established 
to provide uniformity regarding commercial trans-
actions, to facilitate the ease and certainty of commer-
cial relationships, and to establish which party should 
bear losses when the provisions of the Code have been 
complied with. There is no question, however, that the 
Code was not intended to replace all other existing 
Utah law, including the law regarding negligence, with 
a static definitive code. Rather, the Code is designed 
for expansion and refinement of practices through new 
customs, usages and mutual agreements of the parties. 
Utah Crnle Ann. § 70A-l-102 ( l )-(3) (1953) provides: 
( l) This act shall be liberally construed and 
a pp lied to promote its underlying purposes 
and policies. 
( 2) Underlying purposes and policies of this 
act are 
(a) To simplify, clarify and modernize 
the law gm'crning commercial trans-
actions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of 
commercial practices through custom, 
usage and agreement of the parties; 
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( c) to make uniform the law among the 
Yarious jurisdictions. 
( 3) The effect of provisions of this act may 
be Yaried by agreement, except as otherwise 
provided in this act and except that the obliga-
tions of good faith, diligence, reasonableness 
and care prescribed by this act may not be dis-
claimed by agreement but the parties may by 
agreement determine the standards by which 
the performance of such obligations is to be 
measured if such standards are not manifestly 
unreasonable. 
Official Code comment to Uniform Commercial 
Code section 1-102 states. 
Subsections (1) and (2) are intended to 
make it clear that: 
This act is drawn to provide flexibility so 
that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent 
piece of legislation, it will provide its own 
machinery for expansion of commercial prac-
tices. It is intended to make it possible for the 
law embodied in this Act to be developed by 
the Courts in the light of unforeseen and new 
circumstances and practices. However, the 
proper construction of the Act requires that its 
interpretation and application be limited to its 
reason. 
12 
Courts lun-e been carcf ul to keep broad 
acts from being hampered in their eff ccts by 
later acts of' limited seope. They have recog-
nized the policies embodied in an act as appli-
cable in reason to subject matter which was 
not expressly included in the language of the 
act. They have done the same where reason and 
policy so required, even where the subject mat-
ter had been intentionally excluded from the 
Act in general. They have implemented a 
statutory policy with liberal and useful reme-
dies not provided in the statutory text. They 
ha\re disregarded a statutory limitat:on of 
remedy where the reason of the limitation did 
not apply. Nothing in this Act stands in the 
wall of the continuance of such action by the 
courts. 
The Act should he construed in accord-
ance with its underlying purposes and pol!cies. 
The text of each section should be read in the 
light of the purpose and policy of the rule or 
principle in question, as also of the Act as a 
whole, and the application of the language 
should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the 
case may be, in conformity with the purposes 
and policies involved. (Citations omitted) 
(Emphasis added) See also: 1 Anderson's 
Uniform Commercial Code, Section 1-102-3. 
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It is also clear that a course of dealing between 
parties can modify the Code's effect. The Code ex-
pressly directs that: 
(3) A course of dealing between parties and 
any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in 
which they are engaged or of which they are 
or should be aware give particular meaning to 
and supplement or qualify terms of an agree-
ment. 
( 4) The express terms of an agreement and 
applicable course of dealing or usage of trade 
shall he construed wherever reasonable as con-
sistent with each other; but when such con-
struction is unreasonable express terms control 
both course of dealing and usage of trade and 
course of dealing controls usage of trade. 
( 5) An applicable usage of trade in the place 
where any part of performance is to occur 
shall be used in interpreting the agreement as 
to that part of the performance. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 70A-l-205(3)-(5) (1953). 
It is also equally clear that supplementary general 
principles of law are applicable and that remedies 
should be liberally constmed. See Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-l-103 (1953); Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-106 
(1953); National Shmvm-ut llanlc of Boston v. Vera, 
352 :Mass. 11, 223 N.E. 2d 515 {1967); Zab1'iskie Chev-
14 
rolct, Inc. ·u. ,\'mith, 99 X.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 
( 1968). 
There are numerous references in the Code to var-
ious remedies available to a party, although the Code 
does not specify what the remedies consist of. An ex-
ample of this is regarding lost, destroyed or stolen in-
struments. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-804 (1953), al-
lows a party to bring an action to recover from any 
party "liable" for the loss, hut the Code does not speci-
fy the manner of determining liability. :Moreover, Sec-
tion 70A-l-201 (a) defines "action" as a "judicial pro-
ceeding [including] recoupmcnt counterclaim, set-off, 
suit in equity and an!J other proceedings in which right.Y 
are dcte.rmined." (Emphasis added). There is no ques-
tion that the Code does not restrict a cause of action 
solely to provisions of the Code unless the Code speci-
fically provides the remedy. 
'\Then a hank complies with the Code practices and 
procedures, the lbnk can claim the protection provided 
by the Code. liowever, if the Bank has modified ·its 
usual procedures with regard to an item, as Walker 
Bank did in this instance, the Ifank cannot, as a defense, 
fall back on the arg\1ment that the check was handled 
in a manner similar to every other check. 
In the Appellant's brief, '" alker Bank argues that 
the check handling procedures after the deposit with 
'" alker Bank were in accordance with applicable reg-
ulations and customs for handling of the check in Utah. 
The Respondent does not contend that the check was 
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handled other than in the ordinary course of business 
af fer it left the teller's cage. The critical point, however, 
which the Bank ignores is that the check, prior to its 
leaving the Sugarhouse Branch, was handled in a unique 
and peculiar manner, vastly different from virtually 
every other check which goes through the banking pro-
cedures. 
Clearly, then, under Utah Law, the existence of 
the Uniform Commercial Code does not preclude a re-
covery against a bank on a theory of negligence. In the 
case of First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Ezra C. 
Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454, P.2d 886 (1969), 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's de-
cision allowing a plaintiff bank to charge back a check 
against the defendants' account, among other reasons 
on the basis that the jury found that the bank was neg-
ligent for failure to notify the depositors of the dis-
honor of a check. In this case, the bank was equally 
negligent by allowing the check to leave the bank with-
out an endorsement, by attempting to rectify its over-
sight through subsequent attaching of its endorsement 
without notifying :Miss l\Ia<lsen of the first dishonor 
of the check, and by failing to notify .Miss .l\laclsen of 
difficulties regarding the check until 13 days after she 
deposited it. 
In its Brief, Walker Bank and Trust Company 
implies that the recovery in this case by :Miss :Madsen 
somehow will undermine the purposes of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and place unreasonable burdens on 
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collecting banks. This "Pandora's Uox" argument rings 
hollow when one is reminded that the circumstances 
smTomHling this check are entirely unique. It is further 
important to note that even the Uniform Commercial 
Code, in establishing where losses should lie in ordi-
nary, common check transactions, places a burden on the 
depositing hank for losses caused by a forged endorse-
ment. "rhile this does not require a bank in every in-
stance to examine an endorsement, clearly the Code 
provides that it is not an unreasonable burden for a 
bank teller to turn a check over to examine whether or 
not it has been endorsed. Regardless of this fact, how-
ever, the uncontroverted testimony in this case estab-
lishes that the teller did, in fact, turn the check over 
at the time of collection. l\Ir. John Doherty, Assistant 
Yice-President and Assistant l\I anager of the Sugar-
house Branch of 'Valker Bank and Trust Company, 
testified that the large endorsement of 'V alker Bank 
in the center of the check is an item which is applied 
to checks when they are sent as a collection item. l\Ir. 
Doherty further testified that this stamp is applied 
manually by the collection teller that handles the item. 
(R. '219-222). Therefore, this testimony establishes 
without question that an endorsement of \Valker Bank 
was stamped by the teller manually on the back of the 
check before the check left the Sugarhouse Branch of 
\\Talker Bank for collection. The teller, accordingly, 
had occasion to turn the check over, at which time the 
absence of any endorsement would have been evident. 
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A final matter with regard to \Valker lfank's liabil-
ity is its argument that the 13ank is precluded from 
liability because Miss l\ladsen may have retained a 
cause of action against Darrell Hafen. With this argu-
ment, the Rank avoids the obvious fact that no loss 
would have occurred without the Bank's negligence, 
an<l it is difficult to see how 'Valker Bank can complain 
because the Respondent brought an action on the basis 
of the negligence of the Defendant 'Valker Bank and 
Trust Company. 
There is, therefore, ample evidence to support the 
jury's finding that Walker Bank and Trust Company 
was negligent in accepting and forwarding the subject 
check without an endorsement; and it is inconceivable 
that the bank can escape liability by alleging that it 
handled the subject check in the same manner as the 
vast majority of ordinary checks for which no unusual 
or extradordinary circumstances are involved. 
'\TALKER BANK CANNOT Ll~IIT ITS LI-
ABILITY TO THE RESPONDENT BY 
VIRTUE OF TlIE BANK'S RIGHT TO 
CHARGE-BACK A DISHONORED CHECK. 
If '\Talker Bank had not negligently accepted and 
forwarded the subject check without an endorsement, 
the check would have been paid, :1\liss .Madsen would 
have suffered no loss, and no dispute would have 
arisen. However, despite a jury verdict that the bank 
was negligent, Walker Bank now argues that it can 
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escape the consequences of its own negligence by rely-
ing on provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
which allow a collecting bank to charge-back a custo-
mer's account upon the dishonor of a check for which 
"provisional credit'' had been granted. 
This argument concerning a collecting bank's right 
to charge-back, however, does not meet the issues of 
this case. The issue is not whether the Bank may charge 
back ~Iiss ~Iadsen's account. The Bank reversed the 
credit entry on :Miss ~ladsen's savings account in De-
cember 1969, and the Respondent does not dispute the 
validity of that action. The issue, rather, is whether 
~Iiss ~Iadsen can recover the amount of her losses in-
curred because of the Bank's negligence, without which 
the charge-back would never have been necessary. The 
Uniform Commercial Code makes it clear that the 
Bank is subject to liability for its negligence even 
though it had the right under the Code to charge back 
the account upon learning of the dishonor of the sub-
ject check. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-212 (1953), a 
collecting bank which has made a provisional settlement 
with a customer's account has the right to charge-back 
a customer's account in the event the check is dishonored 
or otherwise not paid. Subsection 4 of that Section fur-
ther provides: 
( 4) The right to charge-back is not affected 
by 
19 
(a) prior use of the credit given for the item; 
or 
( b) failure by any bank to exercise ordinary 
care with respect to the item but any bank 
so failing remains liable. (Emphasis add-
ed) 
Official Co<le Comments to this section explains 
the reason for this provision: 
The rule of subsection ( 4) relating to 
charge-back (as distinguished from c]aim for 
refund) applies irrespective of the cause of 
the nonpayment, and of the person ultimate-
ly liable for nonpayment. Thus charge-back is 
permitted even where nonpayment results 
from the depository bank's own negligence. 
Any other rule would result in litigation based 
upon a claim for wrongful dishonor of other 
checks of the customer, with potential dam-
ages far in excess of the amount of the item. 
Any other rule would require a bank to deter-
mine difficult questions of fact. 
*** 
It is clear that the charge-back does not 
relieve the bank from any liability for failure 
to exercise ordinary care in handling the item. 
The measure of damages for such failure is 
stated in Section 4-103 ( 5) . 
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Clearly, the purpose of this co<le prons1on is to 
protect a hank from pyramiding liability which the 
hank could possibly face because of non-payment of 
checks which a customer might draw on the assumption 
that the first item was credited to his account. In effect, 
the Code limits the bank's liability only to the check 
which was negligently handled. Contrary to the Appel-
lant's argument, this provision does not erase 'V alker 
Uank's liability on the subject check which the jury de-
termined was negligently accepted, processed and for-
warded. 
THE THL\L COURT \VAS NOT IN ERROit 
IN REFUSINCi TO INSTRUCT 'l'IIE JURY 
ON TH~~ ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEG-
LIGENCE. 
"Talker Uank alleges that the Trial Judge was 
in error in not instructing the jury regarding contribu-
tory negligence. There is no question in this case, how-
e\·er, that this decision of the Trial Court was correct 
because reasonable m:nds could not differ that the neg-
ligence of \V alker Bank was the sole proximate cause 
of the Respondent's losses. 
The general rule in this case is that the issues of 
contributory negligence and proximate cause are most 
often questions of fact for the jury, except in the case 
where reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to 
these questions. See e.g., Hindrnarsh v. 0. P. Skaggs 
Foodlincr, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (1968). 
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The following facts regarding this case, however, 
make the Judge's failure to instruct the jury on con-
tributory negligence not only reasonable, but necessary: 
A. The teJler removed the subject check totally 
from the control of :Miss :Madsen in order to make the 
confirmatory telephone call to Draper Bank and Trust 
Company; and the check was never returned to such a 
position that :Miss l\Iadsen could have endorsed the 
check. (R. 183-186). 
B. The statement by the officer of the Bank at 
the time the check was taken for collection that :Miss 
Madsen should instruct the teller to call Draper Bank 
and Trust Company, the officer's indication that the 
teller would take care of matters for .Miss l\:1adsen, and 
the action by the teller following the telephone call to 
Draper Bank and Trust Company, all gave implicit 
assurances to l\:1iss :Madsen that the Bank would ensure 
that all necessary actions would be taken by the Bank 
to ensure that the check would be handled with all due 
care. 
C. The teller at \Valker Bank and Trust Com-
pany actually turned the check over at the time she 
stamped Walker :Bank's endorsement on the check (R. 
219-222), thus making it evident to her, as agent for 
the Bank, that the check had not been endorsed by :Miss 
l\Iadsen. 
D. In specifying burdens of losses in connection 
with ordinary check transfers~ the Uniform Commercial 
Code provides for a burden of loss in connection with 
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a forged endorsement to fall upon the collecting hank, 
thus recognizing the natural presumption that a collect-
mg bank examines endorsements on checks. 
In its Findings of Fact, the Court determined that 
the negligence of \V alker Ilank and Trust Company 
was the sole proximate cause for the Respondent's 
damages in this case ( R. 126), and the Appellant pre-
sumes that the Court relied on the doctrine of "last 
clear chance" in reaching this conclusion. \Vhile the 
possible applicability of the "Last Clear Chance" 
doctrine was discussed by the parties and by the .Judge, 
there is no statement in the records nor in the Findings 
of Fact that the Court was relying either partially or 
solely upon a last clear chance doctrine in its failure 
to instruct the jury regarding contributory negligence. 
Indeed, the Appellant, at page 13 in its brief, states 
that the Court "apparently" applied this theory. As 
it has been demonstrated, the Court was justified solely 
on the basis of the eYidence in this case in submitting 
the question of negligence to the jury without the .is-
sue of contributory negligence. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court did base its 
decision, in whole or in part, on a last clear chance doc-
trine, there is no indication that this was error. The 
ordinary situation in which the last clear chance doc-
trine is applicable is in personal injury actions in which 
the Defendant has the best opportunity to avoid an 
accident even though the Plaintiff is contributorily 
negligent. There is no reason, however, that the doc-
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tri11e is applicable solely to actions i1wo1Ying physical 
injury. vVhile Respondent is not aware of any prece-
dent for or against the application of a last clear chance 
doctrine to the type of case before this Court, there is 
authority for the application of the doctril1e to situa-
tions other than actions involving personal injury. In 
Theurer 'l'. Jlolland Furnace Co., 124 F.2<l, 494 (10th 
Cir. 1941), the Plaintiff, a l_,ewiston. Utah, resident, 
brought an action to recover property damages by fire 
caused by Defendant's negligent installation of a fur-
nace, and appealed the trial court's denial of recovery 
based upon a special jury verdict which found the 
Plaintiff contributorily negligent. The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed, among other reasons be-
cause ample evidence existed showing that Defendant's 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the fire al-
though the Plaintiff's negligence was existent at the 
time of the fire. vVhile the Court did not find the last 
clear chance doctrine applicable in this case because 
there was no jury finding that the Plaintiff's negli-
gence was concurrent with the Defendant's negligence, 
the Court recognized the applicability of the doctrine 
to negligence involving inanimate property. The Court 
said: 
The last clear chance doctrine finds its 
most frequent application in actions for the re-
covery of damages for death or personal in-
juries. But it has been applied in cases involv-
ing inanimate property; and ordinarily when 
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applied in such a case, it makes culpable the 
damage or destruction of property where the 
one causing the damage or destruction could 
through the exercise of reasonable care have 
avoided it, even though the owner of the prop-
erty \Vas guilty of negligence in placing or 
permitting the property to be in a place of 
danger. 124 J;-..2d at 499 (Citations omitted). 
In 11liller v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 
375 S.,V. 2d 641 (l\Io. 1964), the Plaintiff brought 
action for damages to his automobile without pleading 
any personal injuries. The St. Louis Court of Appeals 
said: 
But in view of [the I-Iumanitarian Rule's] 
origin and application we cannot agree that 
only injury to the person will justify the nega-
tion of the defense of contributory negligence. 
It certainly is not correct as to last chance 
cases. After all, as pointed out by Parmele in 
92 A.L.R. 47~ .55 "*** the donkey whose de-
mise was the occasion of the decision in Davies 
v. l\Iann *** was a chattel and not a person." 
* * * * * 
In short, courts in l\Iissouri and else-
where have from its inception applied the last 
chance rule (the source of our true humani- · 
tarian doctrine) to an action where no personal 
injuries were involved and the only recovery 
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was for damages to a chattel. 375 S.W.2d at 
645 (Emphasis added) . 
* * * * * 
In further discussing Missouri's "true humanitar-
ian doctrine", the court said: 
[\V]e can see no logical reason why it 
should not apply to an action for an injury to a 
chattel as well as to one for personal injuries. 
If the doctrine proceeds upon precepts of hu-
manity and of natural justice, why should not 
the same consideration govern in both cases? 
Is it humane or just to damage or destroy a 
chattel when the injury may have been safely 
avoided? We think not, and are of the opinion 
that both logic and justice compel the uniform 
application of the doctrine to both situations. 
375 S.,V. 2d at 645-6. 
Indeed, if the doctrine of contributory negligence 
applies to this case, as the Appellant argues, there is 
no logical reason why the last clear chance doctrine 
would not also apply, since the application of the doc-
trine arises only after a finding of contributory negli-
gence. Indeed, the loss by .Miss .Madsen of $5,500.00 
because of Walker Bank's negligence in this case is 
equally as much a loss as the loss of a $5,500.00 build-
ing or a $5,500.00 automobile. The dearth of authority 
with regard to the application of the last clear chance 
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doctrine to commercial transactions evidently is at-
trilmtable not to the fact that the last clear chance 
doctrine is inapplicable, hut that circumstances have not 
previously arisen in which possible concurrent negli-
gence existed in a commercial transaction. Indeed, in 
this situation where an agent of the Bank removed the 
subject check completely from the control of the Re-
spondent, manually stamped another endorsement on 
the check, and was in position to ensure that an endorse-
ment was on the check when it went for collection, 
even if the Respondent \Vere negligent, 'V alker Bank 
and Trust Company certainly had the "Last Clear 
Chance" to avoid the damage. 
In- Reece v. Proctor, 26 Utah 2d 219, 489 P.2d 
1267 ( 1971), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "the 
Last Clear Chance Doctrine is applicable to a situation 
where Plaintiff's posit;on of extricable peril has arisen 
from his own negligence only if the Defendant actually 
knew of Plaintiff's extricable peril." 26 Utah 2d at 
221 (citations omitted). There is no question in the case 
now before the Court that the teller had actual knowl-
edge that the check was not endorsed when she had oc· 
casion to look at the back of the check as she stamped a 
manual endorsement of the Bank. 
Despite the general rule in Utah that the questions 
of contributory negligence and proximate cause are jury 
questions, this Court certainly recognizes the fact that 
a sufficient volume of proof may be adduced to justify 
the trial judge's withholding these questions from the 
27 
jury. There are certainly more than adequate evidence 
and other factors in this case justifying the Judge's 
determination that the negligence of Walker Bank was 
the sole proximate cause of the Plaintiff's loss. 
If the Judge committed any error in his instruc-
tions to the jury. it would have been the Judge's jury 
instruction Number 9- in which he stated that the Court 
found the Plaintiff negligent in failing to endorse the 
check. Indeed, the great potential that this statement 
had to prejudice the jury against :Miss :Madsen in its 
determinations placed an additional obstacle upon the 
Respondent which she ordinarily would not have faced. 
Accordingly, the Trial Judge, in effect, placed an addi-
tional bur<len upon the Plaintiff, and to the advantage 
of 'V alker Bank, in obtaining Judgment against the 
Defendant. The fact that the jury, despite the enor-
mous potential prejudicial effect of that jury instruc-
tion, still determined that Walker Bank was negligent 
further emphasizes the overwhelming evidence of the 
Bank's negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this case more than ade-
quately justifies the determination by the jury that 
\V alker Bank and Trust Company was negligent in 
accepting and forwarding the subject check without an 
endorsement. As this Court has consistently held in re-
citing the standard rules of appellate review, the pre-
sumptions are in favor of the findings and judgment 
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of the Trial Court, and evidence is reviewed in the light 
most favorable to them. Sec e.g., Seegmiller v. 1Vestcrn 
11/en, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 352, 437 P.2d 892 (1962); Ocle-
rich v. Oclerich, 15 Utah 2d 409, :393 P.2d 799 (1964). 
In addition, the bank cannot escape the liability caused 
by its own negligence on the basis that the Bank had a 
right to charge-back the Plaintiff's account, or that the 
Plaintiff's remedies were limited by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The Uniform Commercial Code is de-
signed to be flexible, to expand and enlarge in accord-
ance with customs and usages, and to facilitate commer· 
cial transactions. 
In addition, no issue existed upon which reasonable 
minds could di ff er, other than the fact that Walker 
Bank was negligent in accepting and forwarding the 
subject check and that this negligence was the sole prox· 
imate cause for the loss in this case. Therefore, the Trial 
Judge did not commit error in failing to instruct the 
jury on contributory negligence. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment of 
the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEIL R. SABIN of 
Stringham & Follett 
A Professional Corporation 
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